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We identified several narrative threads as pivotal to 
the understanding of the Middle Eastern and North 
African conceptions of futures with intelligent 
machines. They include colonialism, visions of the 
utopian past (rather than future), contemporary 
political turmoil, as well as technological determinism 
and gender roles. 
 
These are some of our key findings:  
 
• Western perceptions of success, development, 
progress and industrialization strongly influence the 
hopes and dreams for the future of technology in the 
region. 
• The history of imagining intelligent machines in 
MENA dates back to the Islamic Golden Age: a period 
of cultural, scientific, and economic flourishing, 
between the 9th and 14th centuries. 
• Today, Islam does not feature in the wider 
discussion about AI’s implications for society and 
culture in MENA. 
• Contemporary grounds-up initiatives – start-ups or 
online communities, for instance – express local 
hopes for technological futures; top-down, 
government-orchestrated efforts to drive innovation, 
by contrast, often respond to Western conceptions of 
development. 
• The regional perspectives on the future of work and 
automation are linked to existing questions on 


















• The anthropomorphization of both fictional and 
real AI in the region tends to reinforce gender 
stereotypes; robots are often imagined as servants, 
usually in the form of feminized domestic helpers – 
a tendency that raises further questions on the 
adoption of AI in relation to gender. 
  
We conclude that the influence of narratives on the 
future of AI and other emerging technologies is 
significant in MENA. Compared with the Anglophone 
world, however, this influence is less explicit in the 
Middle East and North Africa, and uncovering it 
requires a nuanced approach, which takes into 
consideration not only directly expressed stories – 
novels, films, or media coverage – but also more 
elusive imaginaries – embodied by the local startup 
ecosystems or online communities of futurists,  
among others.  
Narratives about intelligent machines can influence the development, adoption, reception and 
regulation of artificial intelligence (AI). The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is hugely 
overlooked by the Western mainstream when it comes to discussing the future of artificial 
intelligence. Recognizing the vital importance of diversity in the global debate on what AI is and 
should be, this report examines the narratives about technological futures spreading in the Arab 
world. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 AI Narratives Around the World 
Millennia-old dreams of intelligent machines have 
shaped the hopes, fears, and expectations for 
contemporary AI technology. That narratives1 have 
the power to affect the world in which they are 
produced and distributed can be seen, for instance, in 
the role science fiction has played in developing 
aerospace engineering, or the influence of Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein on the public perception of 
genetic engineering. Similarly, narratives about 
intelligent machines can influence the development, 
adoption, reception and regulation of AI: this 
influence has been acknowledged in major 
publications such as the French National AI Strategy,2 
which references English-language science fiction, and 
the UK House of Lords report ‘AI in the UK.’3 
 
This report is part of a body of research on AI 
narratives originally developed at the Leverhulme 
Centre for the Future of Intelligence (CFI) at the 
University of Cambridge in the UK. The term ‘AI 
narratives’ in this context encompasses portrayals of 
life with intelligent machines in the broadest sense, 
including but not limited to robots, androids, and 
cyborgs - terms that in the popular imagination are 
often conflated with each other and with AI. The 
narratives under consideration can be fictional or 
nonfictional, and sources include literature, film, 
scientific and popular works, and news media.  
 
The initial AI Narratives research project, conducted 
jointly by CFI and the Royal Society (UK) from 2017 to 
2019, investigated the dominant Anglophone 
imaginings of a future with intelligent machines. It 
resulted in a range of publications for academic and 
non-academic audiences, including the book AI 
Narratives: A History of Imagining Intelligent 
 
1 We define narratives as an ‘ensemble of texts, images, spectacles, events and 
cultural artefacts that “tell a story’’ (Bal, M. 2009 Narratology: Introduction to the 
Theory of Narrative, Toronto: University of Toronto Press). 
2 Villani, C. 2018 ‘For A Meaningful Artificial Intelligence’. AI for Humanity, 
https://www.aiforhumanity.fr/pdfs/MissionVillani_Report_ENG-VF.pdf. 
3 Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. ‘AI in the UK: Ready, Willing, and 
Able?’ London: House of Lords, 16 April 2018. 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldai/100/100.pdf. 
Machines (2020) and the report Portrayals and 
Perceptions of AI and why they matter (2018).4 The AI 
Narratives research revealed the imaginative sources 
of the utopian and dystopian visions of AI, and 
showed that a small subset of Western narratives has 
been disproportionately influential: the dystopian 
visions of humanoid robots in the films The 
Terminator (1984) and I, Robot (2004) have shaped 
perceptions of what AI is and could become. These 
visions in turn have shaped the implementation of AI 
technologies across the globe. From the twentieth 
century onwards, both those who have imagined 
fictional AI and those who have attempted to build it 
have been part of a narrow elite of mostly English-
speaking white men. Yet, although much AI 
technology is developed in Silicon Valley, and many AI 
narratives are developed in Hollywood, the 
Anglophone West is not the only place to have 
imagined the existence of intelligent machines. In 
other cultures, different religious, linguistic, 
philosophical, literary and cinematic traditions have 
led to different conceptions of AI. Many of these 
worldviews are currently not given the attention they 
deserve. Following on from the AI Narratives project, 
CFI therefore launched the Global AI Narratives 
project, funded by the Templeton World Charity 
Foundation and DeepMind Ethics & Society, of which 
this report on AI narratives in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) is a product.  
 
The Global AI Narratives (GAIN) research project aims 
to build a global network of experts to analyze how 
different cultures and regions perceive the risks and 
benefits of AI, and the influences that are shaping 
those perceptions; to foster new thinking about AI 
around the world by disseminating and promoting 
narratives about AI from underrepresented regions 
and groups; and to connect local academic experts on 
perceptions and communication of AI with each other 
and with writers and artists around the world. 
Through a series of eleven workshops across the 
4 Cave, S., Craig, C., Dihal, K., Dillon, S., Montgomery, J., Singler, B., Taylor, L., 
2018. Portrayals and Perceptions of AI and Why They Matter. The Royal Society, 
London. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.34502 
Cave, S., Dihal, K., Dillon, S. (eds.), 2020 AI Narratives: A History of Imaginative 
Thinking about Intelligent Machines, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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globe, the project mobilizes experts to explore how 
local narrative traditions shape popular hopes and 
fears for AI, and how these influence the 
development and implementation of AI technologies 
in their respective regions.  
 
The Global AI Narratives MENA workshop took place 
in Cairo on Sunday 13 October 2019. CFI partnered 
with the Access to Knowledge for Development 
Center (A2K4D) at the American University in Cairo’s 
School of Business for this interdisciplinary 
colloquium, which was followed by a public panel at 
A2K4D’s annual workshop on 14 October. The 
workshop (see Appendix 1 for details) was divided 
into four themed panels, with participants 
contributing either in English or in Arabic:  
• AI Narratives: Views from the West 
• AI and Popular Culture: Contemporary Perceptions 
in North Africa and the Middle East 
• Intersectionality and AI in the Arab World 
• Is there an Arab Futurism? Conceptualizations and 
Future Studies of AI in the Region 
These four panels were followed by a breakout 
session, during which the participants discussed key 
takeaways from the workshop, as well as ideas for 
future steps – which we will discuss in the conclusion 
of this report.  
 
This report traces a long history of narratives in the 
region, and the way they have influenced 
contemporary sociotechnical imaginaries – defined as 
‘collectively imagined forms of social life and social 
order reflected in the design and fulfillment of nation-
specific scientific and/or technological projects.’5 6 
This does not mean that we are tracing a direct line of 
influence from a specific set of ancient narratives to 
modern technology. Instead, the long history of 
narratives about intelligent machines has a 
cumulative effect, and it is this transhistorical 
narrative influence that we are exploring here. 
Although the modes of storytelling have changed – 
 
5  Jasanoff, S. and Kim, S-H. 2009 ‘Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical 
Imaginaries and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea,’ Minerva 
47 (2), p. 120.  
6 You can learn more about imaginaries in Science and Technology Studies here: 
http://sts.hks.harvard.edu/research/platforms/imaginaries/. 
7 They are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.  
from oral to written to film and games – and the 
intelligent machines imagined in them nowadays tend 
to run on electricity rather than alchemical processes, 
the long history of these narratives has cumulatively 
shaped the hopes and expectations that led the 
twentieth-century AI pioneers to start building these 
machines. 
 
Drawing on A2K4D’s wider expertise of the MENA 
region, this report presents the findings from the 
workshop, and the broader literature review the 
authors have conducted on AI narratives and 
sociotechnical imaginaries in the Middle East and 
North Africa. 
1.2 Defining the MENA Region  
The Middle East and North Africa region is vast, and 
although there are cultural threads tying it together, it 
is also highly diverse. It is traditionally constituted by 
the twenty-two countries in the Arab League,7 
although some scholars also include Turkey and Iran 
in their analyses of the region, as well as omitting 
states such as the Comoros, Somalia, and Mauritania.8  
 
Countries in MENA are not perfectly homogenous in 
their developmental, socioeconomic, and political 
realities, and this in turn affects their perspectives on  
technological innovation.9 The oil-rich countries of the 
Gulf, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 
are regional leaders in the adoption and deployment 
of AI technologies.10 With largely expatriate 
populations (especially in the case of the UAE), their 
governments adopt concerted, ‘technocratic’ 
strategies to innovation and have the financial 
capabilities to make large-scale investments to deploy 
AI across the economy – which also places them 
ahead of their less wealthy counterparts in the region. 
Mid-income countries like Egypt and Tunisia are rich 
in human resources, but are held back in their 
advancement of AI by challenging economic and 
8 Cleveland, W., Bunton, M.  2012 A history of the modern Middle East, 5th edn, 
Colorado, Westview Press, p. xi 
9 Rizk, N. 2020 ‘Artificial Intelligence and inequality in the Middle East: the 
political economy of inclusion’, in M. Dubber, F. Pasquale and S. Das, eds., Oxford 
Handbook of Ethics and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
10 ElSafy, I. 2019 ‘UAE leads GCC in adopting Fourth Industrial Revolution’, 
Mubasher Info, english.mubasher.info/news/3480654/UAE-leads-GCC-in-
adopting-Fourth-industrial-revolution. 
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sociopolitical conditions that they have been 
experiencing for at least a decade. Overall, the region 
is characterized by the prevalence of multifaceted 
inequalities, a young population, and high 
unemployment rates among the educated youth and 
women. 
 
Having said that, MENA has one of the highest 
percentages of women enrolling in STEM fields of 
study, exceeding many countries in the Global 
North.11 In Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, for example, 
women comprise 70% of university science students; 
these numbers are drastically lower for those who 
continue their work in science and research, however, 
as only 12% of STEM-related positions are held by 
women in the same countries. The same is true 
beyond the Gulf states. In Morocco, for example, 70% 
of students enrolled in STEM fields are women, but 
few achieve leadership positions.12 Improvements in 
the access to education for women do not translate to 
further empowerment or wider participation in public 
life.13 The presence of women in STEM fields of study 
does not mean that technologies produced in the 
region are developed by more diverse teams. On the 
contrary, despite much promise and potential, there 
still is a strong need to address wider inequalities - 
related not only to gender, but also class or access to 
education.  
 
The MENA region has a long and distinct cultural 
history, being the birthplace of the three Abrahamic 
religions as well as several major civilizations. The 
term Middle East, however, does not enjoy the same 
antiquity: the designation Middle East ‘arose from the 
imperatives of late-nineteenth-century [European] 
strategy and diplomacy, which needed a name for the 
region between the “Near East,” based on Turkey, 
and the “Far East,” based on China.’14 While the term 
 
11 Islam, S. 2017 ‘Arab Women in Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Mathematics Fields: The Way Forward’, World Journal of Education, no.7(6), p. 
15. 
12 Ibid. 
13 ‘Women in Public Life: Gender, Law and Policy in the Middle East and North 
Africa’, MENA-OECD Governance Programme, 2014, 
https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/women-in-public-life-mena-
brochure.pdf. 
14 Kloppes, C. 1976 ‘Captain Mahan, general Gordon, and the origins of the term 




Middle East reflects a predominantly Eurocentric view 
of this part of the world – a perspective this report 
aims to problematize – to ensure clarity, we decided 
to keep the expanded region of MENA as a widely 
accepted unit of analysis, used by international 
organizations such as the United Nations15 and the 
World Bank,16 as well as research institutions inside 
the region.17  
 
The Arabic18 language is one of the key overarching 
commonalities throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa. The language reflects the key role the region 
has played in the history of science and mathematics, 
providing loanwords in English for some of the most 
important terminology of AI. Firstly, the ones and 
zeroes so crucial to computer science are, as is widely 
known, ‘Arabic numerals.’ The concept of zero, the 
numerals themselves, and the term ‘algebra’ (derived 
from the Arabic al-jabr19) all probably arrived in 
Europe through a treatise by the Persian polymath 
Muḥammad ibn Mūsā al-Khwārizmī (c. 750 - c. 850 
CE). It is his last name that has given us the term 
‘algorithm.’ While in the Middle Ages this term 
referred to the then-newly adopted system of Arabic 
numerals, from the late nineteenth century onwards 
it took on its contemporary meaning: a set of 
mathematical operations that together perform a 
particular task.20 
 
The diversity of Arabic dialects, however, is something 
we must bear in mind when referring to narratives in 
MENA, as not all Arabic material will be easily 
comprehensible to all speakers of Arabic. While 
Classical Arabic is the language of the Qur’an and 
classical literary works, its modernized and modified 
version (what linguists call Modern Standard Arabic) 
has become a lingua franca of the region. It is used by 





18 An important note at the outset: ‘Arabic’ refers to the language most 
commonly spoken in the region; ‘Arab’ refers to the culture that dominates in 
MENA, and that dates back to this region irrespective of today’s political 
boundaries.  
19 Al-jabr literally translates to ‘the restoration’ or ‘the completion’, a reference 
to the method al-Khwarizmi introduced for solving quadratic equations. 
20 ‘Algorism, n.’ n.d. In OED Online. Oxford University Press. Accessed 21 January 
2021. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/4956#eid7070189. 
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by the educated population in the region. Illiteracy of 
the underprivileged populations in MENA is, however, 
a factor we must account for when thinking about 
who gets to imagine AI futures in the region – as 
narratives often rely on Modern Standard Arabic, a 
primarily literary language.21 While literacy rates and 
access to higher education seem to be in a steady 
increase, the numbers are widely unequal for 
different countries in the region, and for different 
socio-economic groups within the given country. The 
entertainment industry, by contrast, often relies on 
verbal communication, and hence draws on local 
dialects and colloquial variants of Arabic; this is how 
TV series and popular trivia shows become easily 
comprehensible to a narrower audience within a 
given subregion or country.22 23 Any story produced in 
MENA will reflect this duality of Classical Arabic and 
the country-specific dialects. 
 
The use of Classical Arabic, the language of the 
Qur’an, as a literary standard in MENA brings us to 
another element that binds the region together: the 
widespread prevalence of Islam. Despite multiple 
heterogeneous factors, including the presence of 
other religious groups, the concentration of Muslims 
per region is highest in MENA (93 percent of its 341 
million inhabitants identify as followers of Islam). 
However, as nearly two-thirds of global Muslims live 
in the Asia-Pacific region,24 it is important to recognize 
that conflating ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’ takes away from 
the understanding of the contexts and nuances of 











21 https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000146282.  
22 See: Rugh, W. A., 2004, Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television 
in Arab Politics, Greenwood Publishing Group; and  W. Al Allaq, 2014, ‘Arabic 
Language in a Globalized World: Observations from the United Arab Emirates,’ 
AWEJ  
https://awej.org/images/AllIssues/Volume5/Volume5number3September/9.pdf.  
23 The Egyptian dialect, however, remains widely understandable given the 
history and spread of Egypt’s cinema, theatre and television series in the region. 
relationship between technology and Islam (see Box 
1), it approaches the MENA region as an embodiment 
of a historical mix of civilizations with cultural origins 
extending beyond its current geographical boundaries 
into the larger Muslim world. The report aims to distill 
several themes predominant in regional AI narratives, 
common for most (but certainly not all) cultures in 
MENA. 
 
What follows is an examination of six narrative 
threads that we have identified as pivotal to the 
understanding of the Middle Eastern and North 
African technological imaginaries and conceptions of 
AI futures. Section 2, ‘The Technology Desert,’ focuses 
on Western perceptions of the region and the ways in 
which they influence the imaginings of technological 
development inside MENA. Section 3, ‘Arab 
Imaginaries,’ is dedicated to the longer history of 
imagining intelligent machines in MENA, dating back 
to the Islamic Golden Age, and illustrates present-day 
examples in Arabic science fiction.25 Section 4, 
‘Resistance,’ analyzes contemporary efforts to create 
regional AI narratives as alternatives to those from 
the Global North. The final section examines how 
political and socio-economic factors shape the 
discourse on AI and other emerging technologies in 
MENA, and how local imaginings of AI relate to 
narrative tropes prevalent in public policy. The main 
text is complemented by information boxes that 
either provide the context for any claims made in the 











24 Desilver, D., & Masci, D. 2017 ‘World’s Muslim population more widespread 
than you might think,’ Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/01/31/worlds-muslim-population-more-widespread-than-you-might-
think/. 
25 See: Renima, A., Tiliouine Richard, H., Estes, J. 2016 ‘The Islamic Golden Age: A 
Story of the Triumph of the Islamic Civilization,’ in: Tiliouine H., Estes R. (eds) The 
State of Social Progress of Islamic Societies. Cham: Springer, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24774-8_2. 































































































Box 1. AI and Islam 
Can driverless cars be Sharia-compliant?1 This question on the potential of AI-operated vehicles to 
follow, or enforce, Sharia was notably the only explicit reference at our workshop to Islam and AI in the 
MENA context – and it remained unanswered. This lack of reference to the role of the region’s dominant 
religion in technological development reflects the absence of Islam in the wider discussion about AI’s 
implications for society and culture in MENA. 
 
Very few scholarly articles explicitly address Islam and AI and when they do, they tend to touch on 
marginal aspects, abstracted from mainstream conversations or theological debates (the question of 
covering humanoid robots’ ‘genitalia’ is one example).2 Contrary to Western expectations, this absence 
does not stem from a clear separation between religion and science (a particularly Western dichotomy); 
on the contrary, Islam places a high value on the attainment of knowledge and scientific inquiry.3 The 
Saudi writer Yasser Bahjatt explains that while his bestselling novel HWJN (2013) is a story about a jinn,4 
it cannot be considered fantasy – it is science fiction because ‘we believe Islam is a scientific religion, so 
we try to explain the claim of existence of such beings through speculative science.’5 
 
Most of the concerns and issues raised at the workshop focused on how new technologies, including AI, 
could exacerbate existing inequalities in the region, not their compliance with Sharia. The absence of 
religion as a distinct topic in our conversation counters the Western perception of Islam as a factor that 
must be at the forefront of any debate in MENA. In fact, the issue of Islam and AI is more often a 
concern for Muslims living in the West, as they are, in some sense, propelled to identify themselves 
through their religion, as an ‘other within.’ The ‘Islam and Science Fiction’ website6 is run, for example, 
by editors based in the US.  
 
1 The question refers to the so-called ‘trolley problem’ in the context of automated decision-making systems; to learn more, see:  Awad, E. et al. 2018 ‘The 
Moral Machine experiment,’ Nature, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-018-0637-6. 
2 Dahlan, H. 2018 ‘Future interaction between man and robots from Islamic perspective’, International Journal of Islamic Thought no. 13: p. 48. 
3 Bakar, O. 2016 ‘Science and technology for mankind’s benefit: Islamic theories and practices - past, present, and future’, in M. Kamali et al. eds. Islamic 
Perspectives on Science and Technology: Selected Conference Papers, Springer Singapore, https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789812877772.  
4 In Arabic mythology, a jinn is ‘a supernatural spirit below the level of angels and devils’ (Encyclopaedia Britannica). 
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2. The Technology ‘Desert’ 
 
Western perceptions of success, development, 
progress and industrialization influence technological 
narratives both in the Global North and in the MENA 
region. Narratives of technological development in 
MENA, manifested in science fiction, the media-
political discourse, and scholarly writing, most 
frequently refer directly or indirectly to Western 
imaginings of desirable progress. Contemporary 
debates on AI in MENA often appeal to or openly 
reject Western perspectives – but in both cases, such 
discourse is influenced by Western conceptions of 
progress.  
 
The influence of these Western-centric visions is 
intimately linked to the colonial history of the region, 
which can be traced back to Napoleon’s expedition to 
Egypt in 1798. Since then, Western scholarship has 
depicted the history of MENA from the thirteenth to 
the early nineteenth century as a time of consistent 
decline, in contrast to the modernizing progress of 
Western powers. The narrative of decline in the 
history of MENA has been internalized by MENA 
populations,26 and so it influences perceptions of the 
region both outside and inside MENA today. Self-
Orientalization, the process of internalizing Western 
perceptions of the region by the people of MENA, 
came up during our workshop as one of the biggest 
challenges facing those who aim to voice narratives of 
innovation in the Middle East and North Africa that 
constitute an alternative to the postcolonial ones.  
 
Western conceptions of development are reflected in 
the portrayals of the region as incapable of seizing 
and shaping the opportunities of emerging 
technologies such as intelligent systems. We refer to 
this imagery as the technology desert: a supposed 
lack – of resources, innovation, and ideas in the MENA 
region. Just as the narrative of decline shaped the  
 
26 Kirecci, M. 2007 ‘Declined discourse and self-Orientalization in the writings of 
Al-Tahtāwī, Tāhā Husayn and Ziya Gökalp: A comparative study of modernization 
in Egypt and Turkey’, PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 
https://repository.upenn.edu/dissertations/AAI3260932. 
27Langendorf, M. 2020. ‘Digital stability: How technology can empower future 
generations in the Middle East,’ 
 
 
discourse on development in MENA in the past, so 
does the trope of the technology desert influence it in 
the present. While some countries in the region 
indeed experience a ‘brain drain’ in the technology 
sector (key innovation leaders migrating in search of 
better work opportunities – most often to Western 
countries),27 the narratives of impossibility and 
absence fail to reflect the actual potential lying within 
the region. They affect the position of the majority of 
MENA countries in the global debate on the future of 
AI, which remain largely overlooked as actors of 
change on a bigger scale.  
 
With its efforts to become a leader in technological 
innovation, the United Arab Emirates could be cited 
as an outlier, perceived by the West as a tech oasis in 
the desert. But this perception is largely related to the 
influence of Western ideals on innovation strategies 
in the rich countries of the Gulf, including Qatar and 
Kuwait (see: BOX 2: Gulf Futurism).  As Western 
designers are hired to execute the state’s flagship 
innovation projects (the Museum of the Future,28 for 
instance) and government communications clearly 
appeal to Anglophone audiences,29 the impact of 
Western ideas of progress on the conceptions of 
technological futures in MENA becomes particularly 
visible.  
 
Significant amounts of funding are administered by 
the UAE’s government to drive technological 
development – something we could contrast with 
resource-poor countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia or 
Jordan, where limited funds are available for similar 
initiatives. There, technological progress depends on 
grassroots efforts and startups and it is precisely in 
those countries that there is an opportunity for 
exploring MENA-specific conceptions of the future, as 
bottom-up solutions are more likely to respond to 
local needs and visions (something we will come back 




29 For example, see: https://www.visitdubai.com/en/business-in-dubai/why-
dubai/news-and-insights/dubai-dreams-big-innovation-future 
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The dominance of the Anglophone, mostly American, 
products on the global entertainment market is 
another factor that contributes to the perceived lack 
of local, MENA-produced stories on the future of AI, 
robots, and machines. AI narratives are most often 
exported to MENA by the West, in the form of sci-fi 
films and TV series such as The Terminator, Star Trek, 
or Battlestar Galactica, which dominate over locally 
produced, but underfunded productions. One 
example is the Egyptian TV series Al Nihaya (The End), 
discussed in section 3.2.  
 
Another, perhaps equally important, influence on 
local AI narratives comes from Japan.30 For example, 
multiple anime series have been featured on Arabic 
TV (most famously, Grendizer was made available via 
the free-to-air channel Spacetoon).31 Japanese AI 
narratives tend to be much less concerned about 
automation-related job loss or themes of robot 
rebellion. Having been influenced by a different 
philosophical tradition, which emphasizes 
connectedness between kinds of entity (such as 
human, animal, machine), they ‘tend to portray 
intelligent machines as friends, helpers or (reliable) 
extensions of humans, instead of as murderous, 
rebellious Others.’32 This form of media globalization 
perpetuates the idea of the ‘desert’: the media 
landscape is saturated not only with Western but also 
Japanese narratives – leaving little room for home-
grown narratives.  
 
The imagery of the technology desert – absence of 
ideas, imaginaries, as well as actual tech development 
in MENA – is, however, only an illusion that this report 
aims to debunk. As we will demonstrate in the 
following sections, the MENA region is not a 
technology desert, but an underappreciated 





















30 The emphasis on the Japanese influence with respect to narrative in particular 
is important. That is, while China — a global leader in AI development — might 
have a strong impact on the geopolitical scale, there is little evidence to support 

















region. See, for example: https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/09/26/how-has-china-s-
role-in-middle-east-evolved-pub-79930  
31 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YykxHRJNuqw  
32 https://www.ainarratives.com/japan-2018 
Box 2. Gulf Futurism  
The imagery of the technology ‘desert’ is paralleled by that of 
the tech ‘oasis’ – embodied by the cities of the Persian Gulf, 
including Dubai, Abu Dhabi, or Doha. While these hypermodern 
municipalities in the oil-rich part of the MENA region can be 
seen as products of the Western imaginary of progress and 
development, they have also become hubs for new, Arab-
focused futures thinking. In 2012, the musician Fatima Al Qadiri 
and writer Sophia Al-Maria coined the term ‘Gulf futurism’ to 
name a new aesthetic trend that arises out of the mix of the 
Gulf’s Blade Runner-like architecture, desert landscapes, 
consumerism, and suppressive social codes.1 Al Qadiri and Al-
Maria list the Kuwait Water Towers (left) as one of the most 
suggestive examples of Gulf Futurism. The artists identify the 
Gulf countries as a social and cultural experiment that gives us 
a glimpse into an arguably apocalyptic future, determined by 
harsh environmental change, deep economic divisions, and 
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The elephant clock in a manuscript by Al-Jazari (1206 AD) from The Book of Knowledge of 
Ingenious Mechanical Devices. 
 
Imagining a Future with Intelligent Machines 13 
3. Arab Imaginaries  
The narratives of intelligent machines in the MENA 
region are rooted in the ‘mirabilia’ tradition: ‘the 
travel journeys, the tales of the animal world, or the 
cosmos stories from the classical period,’ before the 
advent of Islam.33 The Arabic term for mirabilia, 
‘Ajā’ib, comes from the root for ‘to [be] astonished, to 
wonder, to [take] delight.’34 The 1001 Nights 
constitute an early collection of such stories, and have 
recently been reappraised as proto-science fiction.35 
The tale ‘The City of Brass,’ for instance, contains 
descriptions of automata, such as a brass horseman 
that is able to direct travelers to the City of Brass.36 
The Arabic literary tradition of imagining intelligent 
machines is therefore over a thousand years old.  
 
It is not surprising that this imaginary has pervaded 
Arabic literature for so long, given that the MENA 
region excelled in building automata – self-moving 
machines – for more than two millennia. The city of 
Alexandria was a hub for engineers designing and 
building automata from the third century BCE 
onwards. Its most famous engineer was Hero of 
Alexandria, whose work On Automaton-Making from 
the first century CE described how to build an 
ingeniously moving shrine and theatre. 
 
In the Middle Ages, the art of automaton-making 
flourished in the Islamicate world, drawing the 
admiration and envy of the Latin Christian West. In 
eighth-century Baghdad, three brothers known as the 
Banu Musa, wrote their Kitab al-Hiyal (Book of 
Ingenious Devices), which described how to build 
nearly a hundred automata.37 Like most other 
cultures of the time, despite their technological 
mastery, the imaginative narratives featuring 
extrapolations of these machines were characterized 
 
33 Comito, C. 2013 ‘Science fiction in Arabic: “It was not born all of a sudden”’, 
Arablit Quarterly, https://arablit.org/2013/09/30/science-fiction-in-arabic-it-was-
not-born-all-of-a-sudden/. 
34 Campbell, I. 2018 Arabic Science Fiction, Studies in Global Science Fiction 
Series, Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 145-146 
35 Nuruddin, Y.,  ‘Ancient black astronauts and extraterrestrial Jihads: Islamic 
science fiction as urban mythology’, Socialism and Democracy, no. 20 (3), p. 138. 
36 Nights 566-578: The Story of the City of Brass. Stories from the Thousand and 
One Nights. Harvard University Press, 1909-14, 
https://www.bartleby.com/16/701.html. 
by a nostalgia for a utopia set in a golden past, rather 
than looking for such a utopia in the future.  
It was only after the Middle Ages that Western 
narratives began to diverge from this tradition. The 
colonial period was part of a major rupture in 
Western thinking. At this point, the West begins to 
identify notions of technological progress with 
modernity and the future. The first future utopias, 
driven by science and technology, emerged at this 
time: first with Thomas More’s Utopia in 1516, and in 
the sixteenth century with Roger Bacon’s scientifically 
grounded, future-oriented worldview. At the same 
time, the countries where this worldview emerged 
began to believe in their own superiority and right to 
dominate others as a consequence.38 
 
Subsequently, colonial conquest and imposition of 
this world view placed colonized regions as 
irredeemably lagging behind, creating an instant 
dichotomy between those who have reached 
modernity and those who remain stuck in the past 
unless they can become ‘modern.’ The exploitation 
associated with colonialism and subsequent conflict 
stripped colonized countries of their ability to imagine 
their own future. Makdisi argues, 
  
Modernity was, from the beginning, not only 
inextricably associated with Europe: it was a ‘goal’ 
that one could only define as a future condition, a 
future location, a future possibility. Modernity, in 
other words, is, on this account, always already 
displaced and deferred: it is always on the other side 
of the river, or up the stream – or up in the sky.39 
  
At the same time, the associations of modernity with 
globalization, colonialism and exploitation have made 
imagining a utopian future a controversial political act 
in postcolonial countries. The many Western utopias 
that precede any attempts elsewhere in the world to 
imagine a technology-enabled utopia depict their 
37 Truitt, E.R. 2015 Medieval Robots: Mechanism, Magic, Nature, and Art. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 4, 19-21. 
38 Adas, M. 1989 Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and 
Ideologies of Western Dominance. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. Available 
from: doi:10.7591/9780801455261. 
39 Makdisi, S. 1995  ‘”Postcolonial” Literature in a Neocolonial World: Modern 
Arabic Culture and the End of Modernity’, boundary 2 no. 22, p. 90, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/303663. 
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perfect futures as idealized extrapolations of 
(neo)colonialism, the utopias inhabited by 
homogenous white humans. Ultimately, imagining 
and recreating a future in a post-colonial region is not 
only a narrative act but a decolonial one, an attempt 
to disengage current chronology from its colonial and 
imperial roots. 
3.1 Imagining the Future 
Cultural artefacts can both ‘write alternative histories 
[and] articulate counterfuturisms as imaginaries of 
times-to-come.’40 Imagining a future with AI is 
therefore not simply a projection of a new technology 
onto a given location. It is also significantly linked to 
the past and the present, as these shape visualizations 
of the future as a place that contests current realities 
and resolves, one way or another, ongoing and past 
struggles. The future can be imagined through stories 
– novels, films, new media art – as well as material 
and urban realities.  
 
As Laura Brown writes in her review of the anthology 
Palestine +100, a collection of science fiction short 
stories from the Palestinian diaspora: 
  
There is privilege when we look to the future… What 
idiocy to assume you can go back home after war, 
that tomorrow will be well?... To assume the future 
offers a renewed strength suggests you are in a secure 
present, or are confident you have the means to shift 
your present into a more solid future.41 
 
The term Arab Futurism, as Jussi Parikka rightly 
suggests, thus marks a link across a spectrum of 
contemporary political issues - related to race, 
territory, war, and postcolonial histories.42 Cultural 
production in the Arab world has been deeply 
affected by wars and political conflicts in the region, 
and these are echoed in the representation of 
characters as well as themes featured in narratives.  
 
40 Parikka, J. 2018 ‘Middle East and other futurisms: imaginary temporalities in 
contemporary art and visual culture’, Culture, Theory and Critique no. 59, p. 55, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14735784.2017.1410439.  
41 Brown, L. 2019  ‘Arab Futurism’, bido lito! no. 101, 
https://bidolito.co.uk/feature-arab-futurism-laaf-2019/. 
42 Parikka, 55. 
43 Fatafta,M., Halawi, B., Tawakkol, L. 2019 Speculative Data Futures, 
http://menadata.net/public/project/11.  
Speculative Data Futures,43 for example, is a series of 
three short stories by female Arab authors presented 
at the workshop, which examines alternative futures 
using a gendered lens. In brief, one of the stories 
envisions a Palestine where women can navigate their 
urban surroundings safely through the use of a 
mapping application made by women for women; 
another story imagines the reconstruction of Syria 
through collecting the memories of its displaced and 
refugee population by means of chips implanted in 
them; and the third imagines the problematics of a 
government database collecting information on 
sexual harassment in Egypt, and the ethical 
implications of data gathering and dissemination. 
Indeed, all of the stories grapple with uncertain 
futures based on an uncertain present, augmented by 
a cautious view of the increased ubiquity of 
technology and digitization. 
3.2 Arab Science Fiction 
As in other parts of the world, many of the narratives 
about AI in the MENA region stem from literary, 
cinematic and other popular culture representations, 
particularly science fiction. The science fiction genre 
in its contemporary iteration emerged in the 1950s in 
Arabic. During the workshop, we explored how these 
mid-twentieth century narratives, featuring robots, 
cyborgs and other technologies, formed a constitutive 
part of the regional modernization project.44  
 
Scholars have both highlighted and lamented the 
Arabic literary tradition’s focus on politics through 
poetry and fiction rather than other genres such as SF 
or fantasy.45 While Arab science fiction (ASF) dates 
back decades, it has been a niche genre: ‘Arab writers 
of SF… have been compelled, or have wished, to 
adopt the forms of high literature in order to be taken 
seriously,’ a sentiment that was reiterated by Hosam 
El Zembely46 at the workshop.   
 
44 See Appendix 2. 
45 Irwin, R. 1996 ‘Arab Countries’, in J. Sturrock ed., Oxford Guide to 
Contemporary World Literature, New York: Oxford University Press; Al-Nakib, M. 
2016 ‘Arab literature: Politics and nothing but?’ World Literature Today no. 90, p. 
30-32. 
46 See Appendix 2. 


















Examples of ASF include the Egyptian TV series Al 
Nihaya (The End),47 set in a futuristic Middle East (in 
the year 2120). The series tells the story of cyborg 
Zain and features themes owed to the worlds of Blade 
Runner, Terminator and Star Wars. Despite heavy-
handed references to these Western franchises, 
several unique themes appear in the series. For 
example, viewers learn that in Zain’s time, the US 
becomes fragmented and in turmoil (with show 
writers perhaps finding inspiration in the way in which 
popular Western narratives often depict the Middle 
East). As the US falls into chaos, Arab states launch a 
successful liberation war for Jerusalem (where the 
series is set), speaking to a persistent hope in the Arab 
imaginary. 
  
Similarly, speculative fiction anthologies Iraq +100 and 
Palestine +100 include contributions set a hundred 
years into the future of the two countries and feature 
technologies such as AI, androids, and virtual reality. 
In each chapter, authors present narratives that differ 
radically from the past and present of war, 
occupation, and exile: Palestine +100 is set one 
century after the time of the Nakba, Iraq +100 – one 
century after the American invasion of 2003.48 
 
 
47 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pSB8BPMIJ0  




















During the workshop, Yasser Bahjatt, a Saudi 
entrepreneur and author of bestselling sci-fi novels 
(including HWJN) emphasized the responsibility of ASF 
creators to reshape the image of AI in the public eye 
in the Middle East, ‘where our actual contribution to 
the advancement of this technology is even less 
visible and our cultural input on the matter is almost 
nonexistent.’49 We will explore Bahjatt’s point in more 
detail in Section 4, looking at the role of local AI 
narratives as a potential form of resistance against 
Western ideals of technological development.  
 
 
3.3 Gendering and 
Anthropomorphization 
 
The anthropomorphization of AI (giving artificial 
intelligence systems human characteristics) is often 
meant to facilitate a better interaction between the 
human and the machine; yet it can also perpetuate 
gender stereotypes.50 In MENA, humanoid robots are 
often portrayed as ideal domestic servants. One 
example of this trend is Ruby, a robot featured in a  
 
 
49Fossett,  K. 2013 ‘Can science fiction survive in Saudi Arabia?’ Foreign Policy, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/10/can-science-fiction-survive-in-saudi-
arabia/. 
50Costa  P. & Ribas, L. 2019 ‘AI becomes her: Discussing gender and artificial 
intelligence’, Technoetic Arts: A Journal of Speculative Research, no. 17, p. 176. 
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popular Egyptian comedy skit from the 1980s, in 
which the feminized domestic robot readily responds 
to orders given to ‘her’ by the main character - 
bringing to mind today’s virtual assistants, such as Siri 
or Alexa. During the workshop, Mohamed Hamama of 
the media outlet Mada Masr suggested that the 
feminization of ‘helper’ robots and ‘assistant’ AI 
systems in the region is not merely a narrative trope, 
but also a reflection of very real inequalities between 
women and men in the region.  
 
The world’s first Arabic-speaking robot,51 created by 
Nikolaos Mavridis and his team at the Interactive 
Media Lab in the UAE, is an interesting example of 
anthropomorphization of AI in MENA. Rather than an 
assistant or servant, this ‘male’ robot is modelled on 
Ibn Sina (the iconic figure of the Islamic Golden Age, 
known in the Western world as Avicenna) and, 
according to Mavridis, symbolizes the region’s 
scientific heritage, as well as aspirations for 
technological futures. Another local example of an 
anthropomorphized AI system is Zaki,52 a ‘male’ 
chatbot used on an Egyptian internet banking 
platform. While Ibn Sina represents a position of 
power and wisdom - attributes of masculinity in 
patriarchal societies - Zaki is linked to the financial 
sector, traditionally regarded as a male domain. 
Although we can find examples of gender-neutral 
anthropomorphic AI systems in MENA (the Cairo-
based virtual assistant platform Elves, for instance),53 
the cases of Ruby, Ibn Sina and Zaki point to a larger 
trend, in which anthropomorphization of AI in the 
region proves to reinforce stereotypes about social 


























































53 ‘Cairo-based Elves raises $2 million in seed investment from Emaar and 
Kauffman Fellows’, Menabytes, 2017, https://www.menabytes.com/elves-2-
million/. 
Box 3. The Egyptian Society for 
Science Fiction 
 
Science fiction is still considered a niche genre in 
MENA. Several smaller agents have attempted to 
reinvigorate science fiction storytelling in MENA.  
The Egyptian Society for Science Fiction is one 
example. Founded in 2012 by Hosam El Zembely, 
it is considered the first registered society 
devoted to the genre of science fiction in Egypt. 
The Society’s publications touch on various AI-
related issues, which include automated 
governance, AI’s revolt against humanity, or 
romantic relationships between humans and 
robots. The Society’s work began without any 
institutional support – a fact indicative of a larger 
trend in MENA, where sci-fi storytellers not only 
have to compete with foreign, predominantly 
Western, creators, but also receive no systemic 
help. In more extreme cases, some sci-fi 
publications may even be withdrawn from 
circulation by the government on morality 
grounds (as was the case with Yasser Bahjatt’s 
HWJN, a novel accused of promoting witchcraft 
and thoroughly investigated by Saudi Arabia’s 
Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the 
Prevention of Vice before it was allowed back into 
bookshops). 
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4. Resistance  
 
The predominant influence of Western conceptions of 
progress in MENA contributes to a storytelling 
environment driven by the need to develop an 
authentic regional voice through narratives about AI. 
Resistance against the influences of the Global North 
takes various shapes in the MENA region – from 
thriving local tech initiatives, to the rise of online 
communities dedicated to reimagining technological 
futures in the Middle East and North Africa. 
 
There is a clear underrepresentation of the MENA 
region, like the rest of the Global South, across a 
spectrum of global debates. These include more 
general debates on developmental issues and, in the 
case of AI, debates on AI’s applications, impact and 
necessary policy changes. If present, the region’s 
voice is often drowned out by the more dominant 
perspectives from the Global North. This dominance is 
asserted in various ways; the global framework for 
intellectual property and trade, for example, leans 
heavily towards protecting the interests of the Global 
North, rather than those of the developing world.54  
 
New technologies, including AI-driven solutions, were 
discussed at the workshop as convoluted cases of 
cultural dumping; as most of the emerging systems 
are designed and developed in the Global North, they 
harness in them biases that do not necessarily 
correspond to the realities of the Global South, MENA 
included. Facial recognition software, for example, 
can prove problematic when confronted with colored 
skin; natural language processing algorithms imported 
from the West can also fail when used to process 
Arabic. Biases can also end up in policymaking that is 
detached from the local context and corresponds to a 
layered underrepresentation of grassroot needs.55 
 
54 Rizk, N. & Shaver, L. (eds.) 2010 Access to Knowledge in Egypt, New Research in 
Intellectual Property, Innovation and Development, London: Bloomsbury. 
55 A discussion of how big data and machine learning algorithms can reflect 
already existing biases – and aggravate their impact on underprivileged people’s 
lives – can be found in Rizk, N. 2020 ‘Artificial Intelligence and inequality in the 
Middle East: the political economy of inclusion’, in Dubber, M.,  Pasquale, F.  and 
Das S. (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Ethics and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
56 Nabil, Y. 2019 ‘In conversation with Mounir Nakhla of Egypt’s Halan’, Wamda, 
https://www.wamda.com/2019/01/conversation-mounir-nakhla-halan. 
57 Farouk, E.  & Saba, Y. 2019 ‘Egyptian transport start-up Swvl targets expansion 
in Africa, Asia’, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-economy-
 
Countervailing forces come in the form of a dynamic 
pushback from smaller local players, as they carve a 
niche for themselves and increasingly contribute to 
the local and regional narratives of progress and 
development, amidst the influence of larger players 
with more dominant voices. Especially since the 2011 
uprisings (see Box 5) in countries like Egypt and 
Tunisia, a budding entrepreneurial scene 
demonstrates how local startups continue to harness 
the potential to innovate and tilt the balance in favor 
of homegrown initiatives. At the same time, large 
players can continue to consolidate their market 
share, as witnessed in the case of the ride-sharing 
market in Egypt, where Uber recently acquired its 
smaller regional counterpart, Careem. Such market 
concentration is countered by local startups that 
customize services to the realities on the ground, 
typically informal transport networks and needs. For 
example, Halan56 is a successful ride-sharing platform 
launched in 2017 in Egypt, for ‘tuktuks’, a mode of 
transport similar to rickshaws. Another local start up, 
Swvl, was the first player to introduce on-demand bus 
rides via a mobile application to the Egyptian market 
in 2017. While larger players such as Uber have now 
introduced bus services as well, Swvl continues to 
grow locally and expand internationally into Africa.57 
  
Entrepreneurial initiatives serve as ‘rays of hope’58 in 
providing more sustainable work and creative 
opportunities to the educated youth – in a region with 
high unemployment rates among the youth and the 
educated.59 This means that the regional perception 
of the future of work, like elsewhere, reflects a 
concern with robots potentially replacing humans. 
The media also focuses on the need for education and 
training to mitigate these challenges.60 One report 
cites that 45% of jobs in the Middle East can be 
automated ‘now’ while a similar portion of jobs across 
swvl/egyptian-transport-start-up-swvl-targets-expansion-in-africa-asia-
idUSKBN1W10DQ.  
58 Rizk, N. 2020 ‘Artificial Intelligence and inequality in the Middle East: the 
political economy of inclusion’, in Dubber, M.,  Pasquale, F.  and Das S. (eds.), 
Oxford Handbook of Ethics and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Moore, J., Chandran, V. & Schubert, J. 2018 The Future of Jobs in the Middle 
East, World Government Summit & McKinsey & Company; Al Gurg, T. 2019  
‘Education can secure the future of work in MENA region and beyond’, Gulf 
News, https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/education-can-secure-the-future-
of-work-in-mena-region-and-beyond-1.66434742. 
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sectors such as manufacturing and transport have the 
potential for future automation (both through 
robotics and AI).61 Others, including state-run 
newspapers in Egypt, contribute to a more positive 
view, focusing on the potential for new jobs in the 
‘green economy.’62 Governments across the region 
have prioritized training, re-skilling and providing high 
quality education, especially in IT and data literacy, 
across all sectors of employment. This mirrors the 
narrative promoted by the media; in the UAE, for 
example, the government’s strategy for artificial 
intelligence, and other national initiatives such as the 
‘Advanced Skills Strategy,’63 outline frameworks and 
action plans that are already in place to equip citizens 
with necessary skills for the future of work. 
 
Other grounds-up initiatives and grassroot citizen 
activities also play a significant role in voicing the 
regional imaginary of technological futures. Sci-fi-

























61 Moore, J., Chandran, V. & Schubert, J. 2018 
62 El-Hawary, D. 2020. ‘MENA jobs: Gearing up for the future’, Ahram Online, 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/50/1202/360018/AlAhram-
Weekly/Economy/MENA-jobs-Gearing-up-for-the-future.aspx. 
platform for exploring local AI narratives. One 
example is Yatakhayaloon,64 an Arabic science fiction 
group that brings together both fans and creators. 
Another, the Arabic E-Lit (electronic literature) 
website,65 is an online platform intended for Arabic-
speaking practitioners of multimedia storytelling, 
whose mission is to move ‘beyond the hegemony of 
the English language of Anglo-American cultural 
concerns’ and ‘declare a global and inclusive 
electronic literature, driven by the energy of Arabic E-
Lit.’ The website’s creator, Reham Hosny, has recently 
published the first Arabic augmented 
reality/hologram novel titled Al-Barrah (The 
Announcer). This shows that more creators in MENA 
are successfully appropriating emerging technologies, 
including AR/VR and AI, in their practice to counter 











Box 4. Defying the neocolonial gaze 
Assia Boundaoui is an Algerian-American journalist and filmmaker, whose AI-driven INVERSE 
SURVEILLANCE PROJECT aims to re-claim narratives about her community of Arab Muslims living in the 
US. The project combines machine learning and oral testimonies of those from the community who 
have been interrogated by the FBI – to reconstruct the content redacted from retrieved interrogation 
reports. While the project focuses on Arab Muslims living in the diaspora, the artist demonstrates how 
new technologies can be used to revert the racist gaze and defy the dominant, postcolonial narratives 
perpetuated by many AI systems (most often developed by teams composed of Western, English-
speaking, white men). The INVERSE SURVEILLANCE PROJECT also embodies a citizen’s initiative to 
countervail surveillance. During the Arab Spring (see Box 5), there were multiple attempts to resist new 
forms of internet surveillance, but the clampdown on freedoms has since intensified and voices of 
resistance within the region now face harsher restrictions: carrying a similar project out in Egypt would 
most likely not be possible. 
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5. Uprisings and Trickle-
downs 
 
Levels of technological advancement and adoption in 
MENA vary considerably. Variations in turn reflect 
differences in socioeconomic and developmental 
realities and trigger a set of inherent drivers that 
shape the local, intra-regional and region-wide 
narratives. One such driver is the tension between 
two opposing forces that, by and large, shape any 
digital economy: dominant powers versus grounds-up 
initiatives. On the one hand, digital technologies (AI 
included) can perpetuate hierarchies and reinforce 
existing dominant powers on both the economic and 
political fronts. This becomes clear in an increased 
concentration of markets, technology infrastructure 
and data ownership in the hands of large 
multinational corporations, and expanded state 
control. In Egypt, for example, disputes around data 
retention and access for purposes of national security 
in the case of ride sharing, highlights the direction and 
intention for further concentration.66 These forces 
moving towards the center are countervailed by 
opposing currents whereby small businesses and 
grassroots citizenry are emboldened using the very 
same technologies.67 These opposing streams occur 
simultaneously, and while global in nature, tensions 
become more pronounced in the region in light of 
weaker institutions and nascent legislative 
frameworks. 
 
These tensions also imply another layer of complexity 
with implications for AI narratives and visions of 
technology futures in the region. A dominant voice 
will be that of large corporations actively seeking 
further consolidation and concentration, propagating 
narratives largely similar to those of other 
multinational corporations around the world. 
 
66 ‘TIMEP Brief: Uber and Careem law’, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 
December 2, 2019, https://timep.org/reports-briefings/timep-brief-uber-and-
careem-law/. 
67 Rizk, N. & Elkassas, S. 2010 ‘The software Industry in Egypt: What role for open 
source?’, in Rizk, N. & Shaver  L. (eds.), Access to Knowledge in Egypt: New 
Research on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Development, London: 
Bloomsbury, p. 138. 
68 Cleveland & Bunton, op. cit., p. 315. 
69 This theme was explored by Iman Hamam in her presentation: See Appendix 1. 
70 Aulas, M. 1982 ‘Sadat’s Egypt: A balance sheet’, Middle East Report 107, 
https://merip.org/1982/07/sadats-egypt-a-balance-sheet/. 
Governments chime along echoing neoliberal 
philosophies and Western perspectives. Nevertheless, 
the visions of technology futures will also be shaped 
by organic grounds up initiatives who are knee deep 
in local context and find their competitive edge and 
niche in customizing foreign technologies and 
developing local ones to suit realities on the ground.  
 
Historically, modernization was not always 
synonymous with the West. Aspiring to ‘modernize’ 
Egypt in the 1960s, then President Nasser turned East 
to receive support from the Soviet Union, notably to 
finance the Aswan Dam, in addition to military 
support.68 Other regional leaders at the time, 
including those of Syria and Iraq followed suit. The 
Soviet Union thus became a primary source of 
weapons, technological innovation and a model for 
modernization. Space exploration was one of the 
goals that the Nasserist regime aspired to. This was 
echoed in popular culture and cinema. For example, 
Nasser’s aspirations to build an Egyptian space agency 
correlated with the productions of films such as A Trip 
to the Moon (1959) and a feature on Egypt’s space 
exploration in the 1965 issue of Al Mossawir 
magazine.69 
 
The shift to the West came with the introduction of 
the Open-Door Policy by Egypt’s president Anwar 
Sadat following the 1973 October War, as Egypt 
turned to the United States in terms of aspirations of 
modernization and economic growth.70 Washington 
based International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
prescribed and propagated neoliberal policies to the 
region’s developmental and technological ailments via 
the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Program (ERSAP).71 This was accompanied by the 
introduction of the Internet in the 1990s and building 
a strong telecommunication network to provide the 
backbone of the ambitious economic growth model.72  
 
71 Amin, G. 1995 Egypt’s economic predicament: A study in the interaction of 
external pressure, political folly and social tension in Egypt, 1960 - 1990, Leiden: 
Brill; Beinin, J. 2009 ‘Neo-liberal structural adjustment, political demobilization, 
and neo-authoritarianism in Egypt’, in Guazzone, L. & Pioppi, D. (eds.), The Arab 
state and neo-liberal globalization: The restructuring of state power in the Middle 
East, Reading: Ithaca Press. 
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The dominant narrative was of information and 
communication technology (ICT) as a driver for 
economic growth. This resulted in top-down ‘one size 
fits all’ policies, geared towards heavy investment in 
the ICT infrastructure in countries like Egypt. Such 
policies were fixated on economic gains and the 
interests of large, often foreign, corporations. and 
legal frameworks in their favor. This meant an 
impending ‘threat of de-contextualization and 
technological determinism’73 and resulted in few 
direct efforts to customize policies to local needs and 
mitigate inequalities.  
 
The Arab Uprisings, which took off in Tunisia and 
Egypt in 2011, stand as testament to the limitations of 
trickle-down economics and policies fixated on 
economic growth fueled by foreign direct investment 
and multinational corporations at the expense of 
inclusive and sustainable development. Indeed, the 
mainstream discourse was a top-down narrative that  
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boasted high rates of economic growth (reaching 7 
percent in 2007-2008),74 and, in reality, failed to 
capture the discontent that was brewing on the 
ground – and eventually led to the Uprisings.  
 
Currently present in the regional media discourse, is a 
notion that the Fourth Industrial Revolution,75 a term 
that refers to a new wave of technological changes 
causing unprecedented and pervasive changes to all 
aspects of human life, is already in motion, and that 
the citizens and governments need to work towards 
reaping its gains and mitigating its ills. The news 
coverage of the future of work serves as a good 
example. This ranges from a positive and proactive 
outlook to a more negative one. Positive coverage 
focuses on technological development, improved 
efficiency and productivity and government efforts 
to create new work opportunities and mitigate any 
shortcomings.76 Other pieces reflect a concern with 
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Today, it remains to be seen whether similar trends 
will be witnessed in the ambitious developments and 
AI strategies across the region, including Egypt’s 
Vision 2030,78 Saudi Vision 2030,79 UAE Vision 202180 
and 2030, Jordan National Vision81 and Strategy 2025, 
to name a few – as well as various national AI 
strategies. While such plans ultimately strive to meet 
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, 
the impact of such policies on inclusion is yet to be 
tested. This is also the case when we consider AI-
based technology solutions, developed in the West 
without accounting for contextual differences – 
poverty of the population in particular.82 This is 
pertinent to inequality in the region, which can be 
reproduced by AI as highlighted by several speakers at 
the workshop. For example, anthropologist Yasmine 
Moataz noted how issues related to labor and AI 
development particularly affect those who are 
‘intersectionally disadvantaged and multiply burdened 
under capitalism,’ citing the deployment of 
autonomous taxi vehicles in Dubai and the 
accompanying threat they pose to immigrant drivers 
in the city. Yet this assault, exemplified here by the 
immigrant taxi drivers in Dubai, is only one dimension 
of the global economy today under neoliberalism, 
with other features taking the form of diminishing 
public space (to make way for mega real estate 
projects), as well as increasingly widespread political 
repression and policing, two of the many issues which 
could be exacerbated through a hastened deployment 
of AI technologies. In Tabuk, for example, 
Abdulraheem al-Huwaiti was killed after protesting 
the eviction of his tribe from its historic homeland,83 
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development of the futuristic, AI-powered city of 
NEOM.84 At the Qalandia checkpoint in occupied 
Palestine, Israeli forces deploy increasingly invasive 
surveillance technologies, including facial recognition, 
to monitor Palestinian crossers.85 One panelist argued 
that, when contrasted against this particular context 
of profit-driven economies and state surveillance 
characteristic of the neoliberal turn in MENA, the 
notion of choice to use AI for good, emphasized by AI 
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Protesters in Tahrir Square, 2011 (photo: Nagla Rizk). 



































































Box 5. The Arab Spring 
The 2011 uprisings, beginning in Tunisia and culminating in what later came to be known in the global 
media discourse as the Arab Spring, are often celebrated and remembered as leaderless and digitally 
mediated, made possible through a loose group of active Internet users. Yet, the role of communication 
technologies in the Arab Spring is best understood as one of a multitude of factors at play with local 
nuances unique to each country’s upheavals.  
  
In Egypt, mounting discontent with multifaceted inequalities on the ground was coupled with a growth of, 
at least in the early days, ‘unregulated debate’1 in online spaces. Most of the users involved in Egypt were 
veteran bloggers and already active in on-the-ground political struggles since the start of the 2000s. They 
thus shared largely aligned views, and took to the online sphere to discuss, deliberate and disseminate 
their discontent. With the introduction and skyrocketing popularity of platforms such as Facebook (and to 
a lesser extent, Twitter) in 2006 and 2008, respectively, the online sphere grew and transformed from a 
mostly coherent community to reflect a much wider cross section of Egyptian society: internet had ceased 
to exist as a confined space for activists. ‘The ground came online’2 was an expression and sentiment 
echoed by various veteran online users whose presence predated 2011. 
  
This instrumentalization of the Internet as a tool for radical political activism was itself an unintended, 
unforeseen, and undesired consequence of the State’s introduction of the technology in the late 1990s, 
which had, originally, chosen to adopt and market the Internet as part of its growth-oriented agenda. 
However, unlike Egypt, online spaces in Tunisia were strongly regulated from the onset. Nevertheless, 
Tunisian bloggers continued to voice dissent online and the online community was able to successfully 
harness online tools for civic engagement and mobilization.3 Indeed, increased internet penetration on the 
back of economic reform in the early 2000s together with online efforts by veteran Tunisian bloggers in 
the decade preceding the uprisings is thought to have helped create ‘a national collective identity’ across 
Tunisian society. This is considered to have played an important   role in the success of 2010 
mobilizations.4   
  
Interestingly, and perhaps as part of a certain newfound 
alertness of the Internet as a threatening political tool, 
debates within the online sphere today have become 
more and more reflective of the current political state in 
Egypt and of power structures now in place, with regime 
supporters, traditional media and state institutions 
coming online.  
 
While both top-down and (due to reactionary backlash, to a lesser extent) ground-up forces are 
concurrently at play using online channels, there is an irony to be appreciated in how the instruments 
originally intended to serve as the backbone for economic growth (to mostly come from exclusive large 
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6. Conclusions and Next 
Steps 
 
The influence of narratives on the future of AI and 
other emerging technologies is significant in MENA. 
When compared with the Anglophone world, 
however, this influence is less explicit in MENA, and 
uncovering it requires a nuanced approach, which 
takes into consideration not only directly expressed 
stories, but also more elusive imaginaries – embodied 
by the local startup ecosystem or online communities 
of futurists, for example. Understanding the soft 
power of technology as a means of expression, 
especially as it intersects with voices of resistance, is 
critical to appreciating AI imaginaries in MENA. 
 
While it is impossible to approach the history and 
culture of the Arab world without taking Islam into 
account, we have seen that religious discourse does 
not directly feature in the wider discussion about AI’s 
implications for society and culture in MENA. The 
region constitutes a unique storytelling environment, 
defined by a complicated past, as well as 
contemporary economic and political struggles. While 
the history of imagining intelligent machines in MENA 
dates back to the Islamic Golden Age, Western 
perceptions of success, development, progress and 
industrialization influence the hopes and dreams for 
the future of technology in the region. This is why it is 
essential to look for the expression of local hopes for 
technological futures in bottom-up initiatives 
(societies, art projects, start-ups), rather than top-
down, government-orchestrated efforts to drive 
innovation, as they often respond to Western 
conceptions of progress. 
 
The regional perspectives on the future of technology 
and automation are linked to existing questions on 
multifaceted inequalities in the region; the matters of 
class, access to education, and literacy are especially 
relevant to any discussion on AI in the MENA context, 
as AI-based technology solutions that fail to account 
for contextual differences could only exacerbate 
these inequalities. The question of inequality and AI in 
the region also relates to gender; the popular 
perception of robots as supplanting the necessarily 
female domestic helper in the future, for example, 
raises further questions on the adoption of AI 
technologies in relation to gender stereotypes in 
MENA.  
 
This report is a product of collaboration between 
authors who represent diverse disciplinary 
backgrounds, as well as perspectives from outside and 
inside the region. It directly follows a workshop on AI 
narratives in MENA, which involved artists, 
technologists, academics and journalists. During the 
workshop, we discussed the role online communities 
can play in the region – by enabling and encouraging 
collaboration and transdisciplinary work on imagining 
a future with intelligent machines in MENA – as well 
as outside of it – by introducing the Middle Eastern 
and North African perspective on AI and other 
emerging technologies to a wider, international 
audience. Setting up a digital repository of AI 
narratives from MENA, a website that could be a 
starting point for such an online community, as well 
as promoting this report at conferences and among 
communities that often overlook the Middle Eastern 
and North African perspectives on AI, are among our 
key action points. 
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PANEL 1. AI Narratives: Views from the West. Moderator: Dr Nagla Rizk 
Panelists: 
Tomasz Hollanek, CFI, University of Cambridge 
Dr Stephen Cave, CFI, University of Cambridge 
Dr Kanta Dihal, CFI, University of Cambridge 
 
PANEL 2. AI and Popular Culture: Contemporary Perceptions in North Africa and the Middle East. Moderator: Dr Kanta Dihal 
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Dr Nikolaos Mavridis, Interactive Robotics and Media Lab, United Arab Emirates 
Dr Iman Hamam, Department of Rhetoric and Composition, American University in Cairo  
Dr Reham Hosny, University of Leeds and University of Minia, Egypt  
Yasser Bahjatt, Yatakhayaloon: Arab League of Sci-Fiers, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
PANEL 3. Intersectionality and AI in the Arab World. Moderator: Tonii Leach 
Panelists: 
Assia Boundaoui, Director of ‘The Feeling of Being Watched’ 
Dr Yasmine Moataz, Department of Anthropology, American University in Cairo 
Farah Ghazal, Access to Knowledge for Development Centre, the School of Business, American University in Cairo 
Mohamed Hamama, Mada Masr Media, Egypt 
 
PANEL 4. Is there an Arab Futurism? Conceptualizations and Future Studies of AI in the Region. Moderator: Hana Shaltout 
Panelists: 
Dr Imad Elhajj, American University in Beirut 
Dr Hosam el Zembely, The Egyptian Society for Science Fiction  
Dr Muhammad Ahmad, University of Washington; Islam and Science Fiction Website 
Aya El Sharkawy, Access to Knowledge for Development Centre, the School of Business, American University in Cairo 
 
PUBLIC PANEL. AI NARRATIVES. Moderator: Hana Shaltout, Access to Knowledge for Development Center, School of Business, The American University 
in Cairo (Egypt) 
Panelists: 
Stephen Cave, Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge  
Assia Boundaoui, Director of ‘The Feeling of Being Watched’ (Algeria/United States) 
Hosam El Zembely, The Egyptian Society for Science Fiction (Egypt) 
Yasser Bahjatt, Yatakhayaloon: The League of Arab Sci-Fiers, (Saudi Arabia) 
Appendix 2: Workshop presentation abstracts   
PANEL 1. AI Narratives: Views from the West. 
1. Tomasz Hollanek: What is Artificial? The mechanism of metaphorical abstraction simplifies reality to arrive at an easily digestible, pre-packed idea of 
an object, one that misrepresents the object’s essence and overlooks its true composition, but also satiates the end user’s curiosity. Our experience of 
new technologies is often shaped by marketing, rather than engineering – the technological trick depends on successful storytelling, not mere 
craftsmanship. In this talk, I refer to the long history of artificiality as a concept in the West to demonstrate how, until today, it influences the 
perception of emerging technologies in the Anglophone world through the very term ‘Artificial Intelligence.’ 
2. Stephen Cave: Intelligence as Ideology. The concept of intelligence has always been political, in the sense of used to establish and enforce systems 
of power and privilege. This talk will briefly sketch the outlines of intelligence as ideology, then ask what this legacy means in the age of intelligent 
machines, arguing that it is distorting the current debate about the ethics and impact of AI. In particular, it will examine the focus on automation and 
middle-class jobs, the cult of brilliance in the technology sector, and the fear of artificial super-intelligence. 
3. Kanta Dihal: Hopes and Fears for AI in the English-Speaking World. Artificial intelligence is a technology with a rich and impactful narrative history. 
These narratives, more so than the current state of the technology, shape public perceptions, which in turn can significantly impact the future 
applications of AI. In this talk, I will present a categorisation of eight fundamental hopes and fears expressed in imaginings of AI. These are mediated by 
the notion of control: the utopian vision turns into a dystopian one when people no longer feel in charge of their intelligent machines. These 
perceptions of AI's possibilities, which may be quite detached from the reality of the technology, can influence how it is developed, deployed and 
regulated. In a survey of the UK public, the most common visions of the impact of AI, even some of the utopian ones, elicit significant anxiety; 
moreover, many expressed anthropomorphic associations with the idea of artificial intelligence. 
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PANEL 2: AI and Popular Culture: Contemporary Perceptions. 
1. Dr Nikolaos Mavridis: Artificial Intelligence in the United Arab Emirates. The landscape regarding awareness as well as opinions and availability of 
Robots and Artificial Intelligence in the United Arab Emirates, as well as the wider region, has drastically changed: what in the first decade of 2000 was 
just a remote curiosity that few people would have ever experienced, and certainly could not imagine being developed and even existing widely in the 
gulf, has now started to enter everyday reality, and is certainly also an important part of government and business narratives. However, regional and 
cultural effects can play a noteworthy role on attitudes regarding such technologies, as well as on their development, deployment, and acceptance. In 
this talk we will briefly touch upon the history of the Interactive Robots and Media Lab (IRML) in the region, as well as on published studies regarding 
opinions and attitudes on humanoid robots in the region, and also on a wider range of activities and initiatives on such technologies, including those 
targeting socially beneficial domains. A number of interesting peculiarities, difficulties, as well as successes and opportunities will be briefly touched 
upon. 
2. Yasser Bahjatt: Sci-Fi in the Middle East: AI and Its Public Perception. When we say AI, most people think of robots, as our imagination is shaped by 
sci-fi. From movies such as Terminator to the Borg in Star Trek or the Cylons in Battlestar Galactica. This view limits our thinking and hinders our ability 
to properly benefit from the current and future advancements in AI. This puts a lot of responsibility on sci-fi authors to reshape the image of AI in the 
public eye, and that is even more true in the Middle East – where our actual contributions to the advancement of this technology is even less visible 
and our cultural input on the matter is almost nonexistent. 
3.  Iman Hamam: Images and imaginations of robots, cyborgs and automata. Marked in the 1950s by news broadcasts of launching satellites, rockets, 
and space stations, science fiction has been noted as a (re)emerging genre in contemporary Arabic writing and film. I will begin by looking at the 
various experimental films, documentaries and comics that have been categorized as science fiction in order to draw attention to how genre has been 
adopted by Arab artists and filmmakers. I will trace images and imaginations of robots, cyborgs and automata in live action film, animation, literature 
and culture more broadly, with a view to discerning the different ways that machinery and technology -- as part of the modernization project of the 
twentieth century and the military industrial complex that has extended into the twenty-first century -- have contributed to the formation of the Arab 
body as post-colonial citizen/subject. 
4. Reham Hosny: AI as a Narrative Technique: Perspectives on the First Arabic AR and Hologram Novel Al-Barrah. This presentation focuses on 
discussing how artificial intelligence was used as a narrative technique in the first Arabic augmented reality and hologram novel Al-Barrah [The 
Announcer], created by Reham Hosny and Mohamed Nasef. This presentation starts with introducing Al-Barrah as the first novel to combine 
augmented reality and hologram technologies with Arabic linguistic text inside the borders of a paper book to provide the reader with a unique and 
immersive experience. Then, the nature and ways of employing the augmented reality technology in Al- Barrah will be clarified with practical examples 
from Al-Barrah. After that, the presentation proceeds to show the role of hologram technology in developing narration in Al-Barrah and immersing the 
reader in the novel’s world with 
PANEL 3. INTERSECTIONALITY AND AI. 
1. Assia Boundaoui: THE INVERSE SURVEILLANCE PROJECT. This presentation will explore my work on THE INVERSE SURVEILLANCE PROJECT using 
machine learning to disrupt and re-claim narratives about myself and my community as an Arab Muslim woman living in the diaspora. How do the 
intersectional identities of gender, race and ethnicity play out in our work as artist practitioners in the largely white and male domain of Artificial 
Intelligence? How might these intersections - our positionally in the margins, our "in-betweenness" - contribute to new interventions in the field? How 
might the restrictions of access to "big-data" create new spaces for artistic exploration? 
2. Yasmine Moataz Ahmed: AI in the Arab World: discrimination, transparency and accountability. The rapid rise of artificial intelligence technology in 
the Arab world had generated new questions about the relationship between people and machines in a context that is facing challenges at the 
economic, political, moral and social levels. In this brief intervention, I would like to raise the following points for discussion. 1) How does our 
experience and work as anthropologists working in and on the Arab world inform our perspective of artificial intelligence? 2) What is the political 
agenda that lies behind AI in the Arab context? In other words, what kind of pressing questions around discrimination, transparency and 
accountability, as well as privacy and safety of those who are using these rapidly emerging AI technologies shall we ask? This is an ever-pressing 
question given that the primary agora of political debate, participation, and activism is now social media. And 
3. Farah Ghazal: Situating AI in the Global South. Until fairly recently, much of the dominant literature on Artificial Intelligence (AI), originating mainly 
from the West and exported elsewhere, has maintained a recurrent discursive theme of optimism and linear development. It envisions a future in 
which AI technologies permeate and enhance all aspects of life. It constantly points to the ways in which the power of AI is something "we" in the 
Global South can harness for good, or for bad. I attempt in this paper to humbly contribute to a growing body of critical technology studies by veering 
away from the presumptive dichotomy and asking a few prerequisite questions which I believe are necessary for a serious consideration of what AI 
means for the Global South. In the Global South, what kind of subject has the power to create, distribute, and harness AI? What is the political and 
economic backdrop against which this harnessing takes place? What future are we helping shape in the Global South (and for whom) when we engage 
uncritically with AI progress narratives? I try to answer these with the help of a few key concepts in critical theory, such as Weberian disenchantment 
and intersectionality as theorized by Kimberlé Crenshaw. It is my suggestion that by situating AI in a material, socioeconomic and political context it 
becomes possible to accomplish the necessary task of furthering an understanding of AI which is mindful of the implications it carries for the Global 
South. 
4. Mohamed Hamama: AI in Arabic/Egyptian media. The main point of my talk is about the discourse around AI in Arabic/Egyptian media and what it 
tells us about our position in the world. I will attempt to explore the gap between the technological realities of AI versus the fantasies of the 
imaginative mind that shape our current collective understanding of utopia/dystopia and the shadows this casts on how we tackle modern issues like 
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labor. In the past few years, there was an AI boom in the region. For example, the Egyptian government launched what it called the “National strategy 
for AI”. The meaning of this is unclear; and I argue that it’s not clear to the government itself as much as it’s not clear to us. Our current discourse 
around AI is affected partly by the international discourse that simplifies AI into a “much more capable” version of us - humans- and thus jeopardizing 
our domination of our lives and the planet. But, along with this, our local discourse is affected by our (almost) complete absence from the process of 
actually developing what we agreed to call AI. The main problem with this in my opinion is that it forces people from this region into the international 
domain of AI but without the literature of resistance and emancipation that is/ should be developed with it. The result is that it inherited the already 
existing social constructs: gender, race and class. 
PANEL 4. IS THERE AN ARAB FUTURISM?  
1. Imad H. Elhajj: Impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution on Development in the Arab region. The impact of the fourth industrial revolution is 
already being witnessed throughout the world. This economic, cultural, and social impact bring along several opportunities related to inclusive 
economic growth, empowerment of women, and sustainable and responsible development. However, there are also risks related to the job market, 
security, privacy, and the several ethical questions that this technological revolution brings. In this talk we will present some of the outcomes of our 
report "Impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution on Development in the Arab region" which is scheduled to be published by ESCWA this month. We 
will highlight what technologies are most relevant to the Arab region and what characterizes the fourth industrial revolution. In addition, we will briefly 
address the impact on the job market and more importantly how can we prepare for a future we don't know. 
2. Hosam A. Ibrahim Elzembely: Artificial Intelligence in the Wake of the Fourth Wave: The Egyptian Society for Science Fiction. This talk revolves 
around the Egyptian Society for Science Fiction and the contributions of its members, as well as a discussion of some of their work, shedding light on 
science fiction writing in Arabic. The Egyptian Society for Science Fiction (ESSF) was founded in the first decade of the 21st Century and has been 
described as “the first registered and founded society that specifically tackles this branch of literature, by Professor Hosam El Zembely, an 
ophthalmologist and surgeon, and an author in the genre of science fiction and scientific culture. The Society’s members range from the younger 
generation to the well-established writers, critics, and publishers in this field.” Due to unfortunate administrative and bureaucratic difficulties, as well 
as the current context, it is still undergoing the process of being fully established. However, due to the members’ enthusiasm and contributions, the 
work began without any governmental or state support. These activities of the Society and their work includes hosting cultural events, publishing 
anthologies, organizing competitions around the issues and themes in this significant genre, and participating in local, regional, and continental 
conferences that foster this kind of literature. 
3. Muhammad Aurangzeb Ahmad: What is the relationship between Islamic thought and futurism/science fiction? Almost all traditional societies were 
characterized by imagining a past where the world was in harmony, and the present should always try to look up to that Golden Age; the Islamic 
civilization is no exception. Two contrasting worldview are present in Islamic conceptualizations of the future: A pessimistic one where the present and 
the future are meant to get worse as history unfolds itself towards its final fulfillment, and an optimistic one where humans as custodians (khalifa) of 
the world are obliged to create a better world. The former is characterized by suspicion around new technologies e.g., earlier fatwas against 
Blockchain, Printing Press, Loudspeakers etc. The latter gave us the Islamic Golden Age, the Golden Age of West Africa etc. Some researchers have 
argued that Ibn al-Nafees wrote the first work of Science Fiction almost a thousand years ago, and Arabian nights have elements of proto sci-fi e.g., 
robots, interplanetary travel etc. Near present examples include Ruqqiya Sakhawat Hossein's Sultana Dream, Belo's anti-colonial alt-universe novella, 
Ahmed Sadawi's Frankenstein in Baghdad, Ahmed Tawfiq's Utopia, Yasser Bahjatt's alt history etc. Like all Fiction, the future in sci-fi is actually about 
the present. Whether the Sci-Fi has a bleak outlook like Ahmed Tawfiq's dystopian novel or Sufi Sci-Fi Utopias from Turkey, it is about either how we 
think about the present or how we want the future to be. This talk will give an overview of how sci-fi in the Islamic world has been a proxy for the 
pulse of society. Conceptualizations of the future in Science Fiction in the West are not different from what they are in the wider pop culture i.e., the 
Arab and the Islamic world is perennially the exotic other confined to the past. If one examines almost any major science fiction TV, movie or novel in 
the last century or so, one sees the conspicuous absence of Arabs and Muslims. An unstated assumption is that these cultures are passive recipients of 
technology and thus will take up technology in a similar manner or are unlikely to innovate.  
4. Aya El Sharkawy: Speculative Data Futures is a series of short stories, of the fiction sci-fi genre, that explores the intersection of gender and 
technology in the MENA region. With stories from Egypt, Syria, and Palestine the series sheds light on the notion of a futurism in a conflict-ridden area. 
Coming onto the Speculative Data Futures project I worked closely with several illustrators to visualize accompanying images for each story. In 
visualizing a future based on these stories I found myself quite possessed by the potential of imagining and of futurisms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
